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H. T. KOOD, Appellant,

'V.

ELlIER BELT, Bespcmdent.

(la.lb] J'bafcfaD&-JIalpractl__~":"In a malpractice
ease, although an infection appearecl in plainti1r8 ariDary
traet 24 h01l1'l afta!' a eyatoaeopic namination eondueted by
defendant failed to diacloae &rr1 infection, an iDatruction
,h'en at defendant's request that hie neglicence eould Dot be
preaumed but must be baaed on apert testimon)", and an instruotion pven at plainti.1f'8 request that if it be found that
plaintiff II1I8tained an in.Jary as the result of defendant's introduction of a DeW infection an inference &rose that the
proximate cause. of the injury " .. lOme Deglicence or malpraetice on the part of defenWmt "hich it ".. iDC1UDbent
on him to rebut, "ere not GOntracJictory and it eould not be
&aid that the jury".. th'U'8by misled to plaintir8 prejudice,
"here the evidence on the iaaue of causation of the injury
. . . eon1licting.
[I] IcL-JIalpracU__Iutructlona.-In a malpraeti\AI ease, it·"..
.JlOt error to refuse an inatruetion requested by plaintiff that
upert testimony".. not reqllirec1 to eatab1iab a fact baaed
en eommon Jmowledce that danpr ".. involved in makinc
a eyatoaeopio examination withcut FOper aterilisation of the
instruments, "here the inference that an !Djuryresultinc
from an infection in plaintift's urinary tract ".. not caused
by defendant, but from lOme aouree theretofore mating in
plainti1rs 7Btem, ..... not remote but eould be drawn from
substantial evidence in the oaae, and "here plaintitr failed to
eliminate himself .. a prozimate cause of .the inj147.
(8] IcL - JIalpractice - Bviclence--OpiDloD Bvldence.-A medical
expeJ"t is not qualifted .. a witneaa weaa he is ahOWII not
[8] See 20 Oal.Jur. 1081; 41 Am.Jur. 240.
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2] PhysiciaDs, 159; [8] PhY8icians,
156(2); [4] Evidenee,§455i [5] Evidenee,IMOi [6] Appeal and
Error, IlMS-L

/
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only to have the required professional Jmowledge, learning
.kill to apress his opinion, but is also familiar with the
ards required of physieia,nll under .imiJar cireumtitances.
[4] Evidence - Opinion Evidenre - QualiflcatioDl of Expert
neues.-A party is entitled to examine an expert
to his qualifications and experience eo that thetull _!ilrh'tl
to be accorded his testimony will become apparen~. .
{5] I4.-Opiniu E'ficlence-Bnmination of Witn......-In •
practice ease, the trial court did not unduly limit plaintir.11
examination of his upert witness by excludiDg JlYl)OtJllet1tsaQ
questions' as to his Imowledge of exiating atandards in
practice of urology, b'at permitting one hypothetical qUIIII"CIIIJJ
as to the eause Of the infection .in plaiDti1r. .uiDary
where the witness had practiced as an autopsy surgeon
di..: Dot practice urology and did not bow the methoc1a
practice in the diagnc.stic or treatment Selda, and where
did not appear that further examination, either .. to
qualiflcatioDl or his opinion of theeause of the mrection,1
would have accorded greater weight to his testimony.
[8] Appeal-Barmless and Prejudicial Brror-BuliDp .. to
M888&-In a malpractice ease, plainti1r could not CODlplliLiJal
of prejudice by reason of thJ eourt's refuaal k permit an
pert witness to explain his "yes" &DBwer to the question
whether his opinion on the hypothetical ease usumed competent manipulation of instruments in the eyatoacopic 8UJ!)jna..
tion conducted by defendant, where an ezplanation of the anner was not Deceuary in view of the fact that the court
properly ruled that the witness was not quali8ed to give .
opinion concemiDgthe' exiBtiDg .tandarda in the practice
urology.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Angeles County. William S. Baird" Judge. Aftirmed.
Action for damages for malpraCtice. Judgment for QCU:encl-.
ant affirmed.
E. Briggs Howarth and Walter R. 'l'rinkaWl for Appellant. '
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter " Baltbis
behalf of Appellant.
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Fulcher" W)'DJl, Gibson, Dmm " Crutcher and Phillip O.
Sterry for Respondent.
Hartley F. Peart, GWI L. Baraty, Boward Bassard, George
A.Smith, Alan L. Bonnington, Reed" Kirtland and Louis I.
Regan 88 Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondem.
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SHENK, J.-Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a
verdict for the defendant in an action to recover damages for
alleged malpractice. The appeal is on a 8ettled statement.
Due to an admitted con1Uct in the testimony it is not contended
that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The
plaintiff'. principal assignments are that the court committed
prejudicial error in the instrUctions on the issue of negligence
and in rulings on the admiBBion of evidence.
The defendant is a physician practicing in the county of
Los Angeles and hasapecialized in urology lince 1923. The
plaintiff, an attorney, is 46 years old and resides in Loa Angeles. He formerly Uvedin Tens. On June 7, 1944, he appeared at the defendant'a office. pursuant to an appointment.
His medical history given at that time showed the foDowing:
In childhood he experienced the usual ehildren'a diseases.
In his youth he had troublt> withhia left testicle which was
!IImalJ and would draw up into the abdomen upon pressure.
This condition continut>d throughout the years causing him
pain and discomfort. Beginning about 1920 a sinus infection
developed which gave him much distress. Drainages in 1921
quieted the area somewhat until 1930. The difliculty recurred
and in 1932 he had a bone cutting operation which did not
entirely remove the trouble. At times he had a alight rheumatic pain in the right wrist. Periodic pain centering in the
lower abdominal region commenced about 1936. It was preceded by a alight nonvenereal urethral diaeharge which disappeared after treatment. X-ray and ftuoroaeopic examinations were made in El Paso and again in 1939 in Los Angeles
in an attempt to locate the ·origin of the abdominal pain, and
in 1942 the appendix was removed. But the diflieulty remained and called for further study. For this purpose the
plaintiff was sent by his personal physician to the defendant.
At the defendant'a oflice the plaintiff was subjected to examination and testa of the prostatic· secretion, the urine, and for
syphilis. Be was then prepared for cystoscopic examination
which was conducted by the defendant with the use of instruments and ftuids inaerted through the ureters. X-ray pictures
were taken. Before he departed the plaintiff was informed by
the defendant that the tests showed negative results except
for five per cent pus cells in the prostatic secretion which
was stated to be normal, and that his trouble could not be
traced to any infeetionor difliculty in the genito-urinary
system.
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'!'he plaiDtUf worked. at his oftlce the following day .,ud eve.;
aing until 8 o'clock when he had a chill and 'went home. ~
and fever continued alternately throughout the night and the
nut day. The defendant was out of the city and the plainti1r)
called Dr. Hyde who took aamples of urine·to his laborato17
for testa and later reported the results which were not given',
in evidence. Sulfa drup were aent from the defendant'. office .
.for administration. The following day Dr. Guth of the defendant's staff called, made examinations and advised con-'
tinuing the drup. ChDla and profuse neating continued.'
and the plaintUf was taken to a hospital where he was attended by Dr. Ebert from the defendant's oftlce. Dr. Ebert
informed the plaintiff that he was being treated for an acute
infection of the urinary paasagea but it was not understood
how the infection arose. The ehills and fever abated on June~
14th and on June 16th the plaintiff returned to his home
where he was eonftned for 10 days. On June 27th, be reported .
at the defendant's oftlce and after prostatic and urinary testa ":
was told he had a 95 per cent infection. Subsequent testa.
showed the infection decreasing gradually to 10 per cent. Be·.·.
was informed that the defendant did not mow the cause of .
the infection. The plaintiff then began treatment with his':.
personal physician. Because of an apparent allergy to sulfa '._
drup, penicillin was substituted in the treatment and appar- ;
~
ent1y proved more effective.
On the trial the plainti1f produced one expert witness, an .
autopsy surgeon in Loa Angeles, who testified that in his opin- :.
Ion the 24 hours between the cystoscopic examination and the'
fever symptoms conatituted an incubation period for bacteria
introduced into the delicate channels by unsterile instruments :
or, assuming proper aterilizationof the' instruments, from the
opening of the channels whose edges were not thoroughly
cleansed; that the results showed a well-aeated infection in the '
urinary tract which was not present prior to instrumentation. Witnesses produced by the defendant testified eoneemiDg
standards of treatment and sterilization methods and stated
tbat in their opinion the infection was not eaused by any
unsterile preparatory procedure nor introduced from outside ~
sources in the conduct of the eystoseopic examination but,
baaed on the prior medical history, was attributable to lowgrade chronic infection in the genito-urinary traeta, probably
prostatic in origin, or to the use of sulfa drugs, or to in1iuenza
from respiratory j,n.fiammation or sinus infection.
i
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At the defendant'sreqnest the court charged the jury in
,tmbetance that the defendant's negligence could n,ot be preaumed but must be based on the testimony of operts;' also
that the jury could not set up a standard but must be governed
eolely by the testimony of expert witnesses.
The plainti1f requested an instruction (based 0Ji B.A.J.I.
214-B Pocket Parts) embodying the substance of the foregoing instructions and adding that expert testimony was not
required to establish a faet based on common knowledge that
danger is involved where eertainpreeautioD8.!)' measures in'«ucting sterilization are not followed, ''Where1ipon ,whether the
:4Ondition was caused by negligenee may bedecnded in the ligh't
'of snch common knowledge. ''The requested' instruction was
refused but at the plaintiff's request the jury 'was charged
that if it be found that the plainti1f 'sustained injury as the
:result of the introduction by the defendant of a' new infection,
an inferenee arose that the proximate cause of the injury was
eome negligenee or malpractice on the part of the defendant
which it was incumbent npon him to rebut by clear, positive
and uncontradicted evidence that the injury oeeurred without
any faUure of duty on hill part.
"
[la] The plaintiff contends that the instructions given were
-eGnfticting and confused the jury; that the correct theory
of the ease is that as a matter of common knowledge the result
does not usually, happen when sterilization has been proper;
that expert testimony was not required to prove negligenCe;
therefore that the instructions in conftietwith, ~ theory
,
,were erroneous, misleading and prejudieiat '
On the other hand the defendant, supported by state ana
county medical assoeiations as amici curiae, questions the propriety of any application of a ,doctrine based on common
knowledge in the absenee of the fact first established without
conflict that the infeetion was introdueed by the act of the
defendant. It is therefore contended that the reeor<} presents
issues of fact solely within the knowledge of aperts and that
the plaintiff's given instruction which incorporated a statement
of the res ipsa loquitur doetrine was more favorable to him
than the record warranted.
'
The given instruetions embodied a atatement of the general
rule that the proper and usual practiee in diagnosis and treatment is a question for experts and can be established only by
their testimony. (PerlriftB v, Tn,eblood, 180 Cal. 437, 443
[181 P. 642]), and the exception declared in Btlrkm v. Wid-
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"g, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173], and other cases relied on b
the plaintift.
In BarhGm v. Widing the defendant extracted a tooth fro
the plaintift's jaw. An infection developed which from th
evidence could be traced to the use of an UIl8terile bypodermi
needle or solution inserted to anaesthetize the jaw. The ju
was instructed that if the defendant 'used an unsterile needl
()r solution which proximately caused the infection the plaintiff should recover. It was claimed that the omission of the
words "carelessly and negligently" was prejudicial error.
This court aftirmed the judgment entered on the verdict for
the plaintift and determined that the mere fact of infection
following and traceable to improper sterilization was evidence
of carelessness and negligence; that the court would take
judicial notice that in common knowledgl' such a result does
not follow proper sterilization and that observance of the
.ordinary standards would preclude tht> oat> of an unsterile
needle or solution; therefore the omitted words were not neeessary to a proper charge.
Declarations to similar effect and variously stated have been
applied in many situations. (Diermaft v. Prtwidence Holpital,
31 Cal.2d 290 [188 P.2d 12] ; Yba"a v. Spafigard, 25 Cal.2d
.486,489 [1M P.2d 687,162 A.L.R. 1258]; Lawl", v. Calaway, i
24 Cal.2d 81, 86 [147 P.2d 604] ; Belland. v. Park Sanitarium
bm.,214 Cal. 472,480 [6 P.2d 508] ; Meyer v. McNutt BOIpital, 173 Cal. 156 {159 P. 436] ; Dean v. Dyer,64 Cal.App.2d
646,658 [149 P.2d 288] ; Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Cal.App.2d
499, 504 [134 P.2d 865]; WGlter v. England, 133 Ca1.App.
676, 680 [24 P.2d 930]; ItKlerbiben v. Lane Hospital. 124
Cal.App. 462, 467 [12 P.2d '144, 18 P.2d 905].) . In other i
cases the doctrine bas been recognized. (Sins v. Owem, 38
Cal.2d 749, '158 [205 P.2d 3] ; Bngelking v. Caru01l .. 13 Cal.2d
216, 221 [88 P.2d 695] and cases cited; Ch'lrck v. Blnch, 80
Cal.App.2d 542, 548-M9 [182 P.2d 241]; Riring v. Veatch,
117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [8 P.2d 1023] ; Donahoo v. Louas, 105
Cal.App. '105, '109 [288 P. 6981.)
[2] In the eases cited where the doctrine was beld applicable evidence that tht> defendant did not cauSl' tbt> injury
was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge
from the nature of the injury that tbe result would not hap.
pen without carelessness or negligence. In tbt' present C8SP
the inference that the injury was Dot caused by tbt> defendant, but from some source theretofoTP t'Xisting in th~ plaintiff's
IYstem, was not remote but could be drawn from substantial

I
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evidence in the record. On the evidence of the plainti«'.
medical history the jury was not required to but could reasonably conclude that the prior infection, and not any negligent
act on the part of the defendant, was the proximate cause of
the trouble. The inference based on common knowledge is at
the root of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Before it eould be
drawn under the facts of this case the jury would have to
reject the hypothesis that the plaintiff's prior condition was
the proximate cause. (Prosser, Torts, p. 295; Prosser, article Be. Ip.a Loquitur in CaU{omf.tJ, 37 CaI.L.Rev. '183,
201; Yba"a v. 8pt1ngud, ,,"pra, 25 Cal.2d atp. ~9.)
Omitted from the plaintiff's refused instruction but included
in his given instruction covering the rea ipsa loquitur doctrine,
is the necessary element of causal connection between the act
and the injury. [lb] An instruction based on the plaintiff'.
theory that the exception only Bhouldbe applied would resolve in his favor the issue of causation and thereby take that
question from the jury's consideration. The evidence on that
issue was conflicting and the court correctly aubmittE'd the case
to the jury with the inclusion of the element of causation,
thereby calling for statements of both the general rule and
the exception. (See Ba,.ham v. Widing, ,,"pra, 210 Cal. at
p. 216; Nellon v. Paints" ·Parke,., 104 Cal.App. '170. '175
[286 P. 1078].) Since there was no real contradiction as to
the applicable theories, it may not be said that the jury was
misled to the prejudice of the plaintiff on a record of conflicting evidence containing snbstantialeupport for the jury's
verdict, and this court is therefore not at liberty to disturb
the result of the jury'. deliberations.
It is urged that the trial court unduly limited the plaintiJf'.
examination of his expert witness. It appeared from the
timony of. this witness that he had practiced as an autopsy
surgeon for 29 years. that be did not practice urology, did
not conduct genito-urinary examinations in the diagnostic
or treatment flelds, and did not know the method. of practice
therein, but that he bad learning and knowledge of the anatomy and of infections in TE'lation to thE' genito-urinary system.
When this testimony was given and after consultation and
offers of proof in chambE'rs. the court excluded hypothetical
questions addressed to this witness based on his knowledge of
the existing standards in the practice of urology, hut permitted one hypothetical question to elicit the witness' opinion as
to the cause of the infection.
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[3] A medical expert is not qualified as a. witness unless
he is shown not only to have the required professional knowledge, learning and skill to express his opinion, but is also
familiar with the standards required of physicians under similar circumstances. (Sinz 'I. Owens, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at p. 753
et seq.) [4] A party is entitled to examine an expert witness as to his qualifications and experience so that the full
weight to be accorded his testimony will become apparent.
(Salmon v. Ratkjens, 152 Cal. 290, 299 (92 P. 733].) [5] But
in view of the witness' admitted lack of practice in urology
the extent of the examination as to his qualifications in relation to the subject matter of his opinion was within the sound
discretion of the trial court. (Sins v. Owens, supra, 33 Cal.
2d at p. 753.) The witness gave a chronological account of
his education and experience and demonstrated his anatoinical
knowledge as it related to the genito-urinary system. It does
not appear that further examination either as to his qualifications or his opinion of the cause of infection would have
accorded any greater weight to his testimony. The plaintiff
was not unduly restricted on direct or rebuttal examination
by rulings sustaining objections to further hypothetical questions which were repetitions of the question answered by the
witness and to questions on subjects not within the limits
of the witness' qualifications as determined by the court.
[6] Likewise the plaintiff may not complain of prejudice by
reason of the court's refusal to permit the witness to explain
his "yes" answer to the question whether his opinion on the
hypothetical case assumed competent manipulation of instruments in the examination conducted by the defendant. Inasmuch as the court properly ruled that the witness was not
qualified to give his opinion concerning the existing standards
in the practice of urology, an explanation of ,the answer was
not necessary. No prejudicial error or abuse of discretion is
shown.
The judgment is affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree with either the
result or the reasoning of the majority opinion. This case
. was ably and correctly disposed of by the opinion of Justice
Vallee in the District Court of Appeal, and with some additions and deletions, I adopt that opinion as follows (90
A.C.A. 248):

..
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" Appellant '. usignments of error are: (1) the court
erred in giving instructions ,requested by respondent and in
refusing to give instructions requested by appellant, (2) the
court erred in 81IStaining objections to questions asked the
expert called by appellant for the purpose of establishing
his qualifications, in 8U8taining objeCtions to hypothetical
questions asked the expert, in not permittiDg him to explain
a 'Yes' answer, and in SUBtaining objections to iJuestions
asked him on rebuttal which a.umed faeta developed by the
defense.
, "The evidence germane to 'the ilrtt UBignmeJltof 'error
will be related. Appellant went to Dr. Belt'. ofBce on June '1,
1944, for a cystoscopic examination. At the time be 'was •
man 41 years of age. After giving ·the ·aoctor a hiStory, he
was partially disrobed, the doctor palpated his abdomen
and examined· his testicles. He was then 1aken to another
room for further examinations and tests preparatory to the
cystoscopic examination. Be was disrobed and clothed with
a BlU'gical gown. His pulse and temperature were taken. A
test was made of his hemoglobin. His lungs and teeth were
examined. .Samples of his urine were taken, tested and found
negative. His blood pressure was taken. A syphilis test was
made. It was negative. A prostatic ID8SIJ8ge was performed
and a sample taken of the prostatic aecretion.
"After a wait, appellant was taken toa cystosCopic examination room and assi.Bted onto a table. The table was 80' conatructed that he could be turned from a prone position to· an
erect standing position without being removed from the table.
While on the table appellant could not lee and did not know
what was being done except what he could feel. A layman,
called a technician, 26 years of age, in the absence of Dr. Belt,
prepared appellant for instrumentation. '!'he layman picked
up a tray from a nune in the next room. .,he tray contained
an installator, swab, water tube, two syringes, a peroneal
towel and a sheet. He washed appellant'a male organ,
injected an anesthetic therein and inserted a *.inch stopper
to hold the anesthetic in place. Dr. Belt took a cystoBcope
from a tray in another room and went into the examination
room. A .eystoBcope is an instrument about twice the length
of a fountain pen, with a diameter smaller than a fountain
pen, made of copper and nickel plated, with the end turned up
and a hollow ahaft. It was lubricated with a non-oily lubricant. The layman removed the stopper. Dr. Belt introduced

.-
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the cystoscope into the opening, inserted it th;rough the
organ into the bladder and observed· the interior of the
bladder. The ureter openings into the bladder and the interior
of the bladder appeared normal in every respect. Catheters
were inserted through the cystoscope into the bladder through
both renal pelves and pushed through the ureter to the
kidneys. The catheters had been threaded into the cystoscope
by someone not named in the evidence. A specimen of urine
was collected through the catheters into test tubes and when
examined it was found that there was no bacteria or pus
present. A dye solution was injected into each uretral catheter
and X-rays taken while appellant was in a prone position and
also while he was in a standing position and while instruments
remained in his body. The catheters were withdrawn and the
solution remaining in the ureter was allowed to trail to the
bladder as far as the prostate level and X-ray pictures taken
of the area. All X-ray pictures were negative.
"Dr. Belt testified that: the examination sho-wed appeUant's
urinary tract from the kidney.~ down to the prostate was in a
normal condition; it was a textbook picture of normalcy; after
the examination he told appellant that his ge1l1:to-urinary system was negative. He testifipd that fever which develops an
unusual time after a cystoscopic examination is not thenormal
reaction therefrom. Dr. Belt told appellant that if any reaction occurred at all it would ~)ccurwithin two hours. He also
told him that the examination was entirely negative, that the
blood count, hemoglobin. beart pulse and respiration were
normal. Dr. Belt told him that his prostate, prostatic secretion and urine were normal, that his prostate was normal in
size, shape and consistency, that his bladder was normal, that
both his prostate and bladder were negative ~ to any pathological condition, that his kidneys and ureters were normal,
that he was a textbook picture of perfection.
"About 24 hours later-4 o'clock the next day-appellant
began feeling odd. He began baving chills about 8 o'clock
that night. He had chills and fever all night and all the next
day. June 9. On June 10. he received some medicines from
Dr. Belt's office which he understood were sulfa drugs. He
started to take the sulfa drugs the afternoon of June 10. He
continued to have chills and fever on June 10 and 11. On
June 11, Dr. Gnth. an assistant of Dr. Belt, went to appellant's home, examined bim and told him to continue taking
the medicine. A PPE-Hant continllf'rl to have alternate chills
and fever. His temperature became progressively higher, ru.n-
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Ding to 105 degrees about 10 p. m. on June 11. He was then
taken to a hospital on the advice of Dr. Belt's assistant. The
ehills and fever continued. The sulfa drugs were diseontinued on June 13 at 2 :30 p. m. but the fever and ehills pe1'listed
until June 14. Be remained in the hospital until the afterl100n of June 16.
"While in the hospital appellant was attended by Dr. Ebert,
another assistant of Dr. Belt. Appellant, while in the hospiia1, asked Dr. Ebert what was causing 1u 16t1ef" elm. .tad
ligh litlef'. Dr. Ebert replied, 'That's hard to 1&1. Btllf'f/one
BOtOs flO. loti' •• OCfI.f, -fecfioA of lie .rlMt'fI poISGg",
but I e&D't understand how it got there. But that is why you
are being given the sulfa drugs and pyridium.These mediemes are for infectionS of that kind." Dr. Ebert, although
still in the employ of Dr. Belt, was not ea1led as a witness.
"On June 27, when appellant was able to leave his home
for the first time, he went to Dr. Belt's office. Be was given
a prostatic massage by Dr. Guth and samples of his urine were
taken for tests. After the tests were completed, he asked Dr. I
Guth the results. Dr. Guth told him that the tests showed
that he atill had a 25 per cent infection. Appellant was
gil'en prostatic massages by Dr. Guth until July 28, 1944. On
each oeeasion Dr. Guth told him that he had an infection present in the urinary tract but that the amount was gradually deereasing 80 that at the time of his last visit the test ahowed
only 10 per cent. Dr. Belt was away from Los Angeles from
June 9 to June 23. Sometime thereafter and while Dr. Guth
was giving appellant a prostatic massage, Dr. Belt appeared
and appellant said, 'Dr. Belt, Dr. Guth just told me that I
atill hal'e 10% infection present. I didn't have ImY infection
when I came in here in June and J don't see why I should
have any now.' Dr. Belt replied that 10 per cent was within
normal limits. Appellant then asked Dr. Belt what had caused
the infection in the urb1ar1 tract and the severe chills and
high fever. Dr. Belt replied, 'To tell the truth, 1 don't know.'
Dr. Belt did not deny having made this answer to appellant's
query. Dr. Guth was in Wisconsin at the time of the trial.
His deposition was not taken.
"The expert called by appellant testified that the 24 hours
between the time of the examination and the time appellant
began to have chills and fever probably was an incubation
period for bacteria introduced into the urinary tract in the
preparation for, or in the making of the examination, that
_" .,....;:$0...
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the introduction was evidently due to some defective condition
of the instruments or carrying in from' the opening of' the
meatus (the canal in the male organ), whose edges were not
thoroughly cleansed, and that the treatment given in the
hospital was for an infection of the urinary tract.
"As we read the record, there is no evidence that either the
stopper or the cystoscope or the catheters used in the examination were sterilized before insertion into appellant's body.
Neither the lay technician nor Dr. Belt sterilized anyone of
them or saw anyone of them sterilized. No one testified that
~e sterilized anyone of them. On the other hand, there is no
direct evidence that they were not sterilized.
.. Appellant's contention is stated in his brief. He says,
• (a) His genito-urinary system was in a healthy and normal
condition on June 7,1944, when he reported to respondent for
a urological examination, every part of that system beine
free of infection of every kind and description. This was established by the records and testimony of respondent which
showed that immediately prior to the cystoscopic examination
and on the same date appellant was given various tests, including tests of his urine, prostatic secretion, blood etc., all of
which were negative and showed no infection present and,
further, that the urological examination disclosed appellant's
genito-urinary system to be in a healthy and normal condition. (b) About 24 hours after the cystoscopic examination
had been completed by respondent, symptoms appeared showing that an infection had developed which the evidence established was within the confines of appellant's genito-urinary
system. Appellant testified to the appearance of such symptoms approximately 24 h.ours after the examination. It was
shown that 24 hours was the normal incubation period for Ii
new infection of this type. And the fact that such infection
which did not exist immediately before the examination, did
-exist approximately 24 hours after the examination, was established by the uncontradicted admissions of respondent and
his assistants, by the nature of the treatment given, and also
by expert testimony offered through Dr. Webb. (c) This infection had been caused by infectious matter which had been
.carried into appellant's urinary tract during the urological
examination. Proof of (a) and (b) give rise to this inference
which is further and directly established by the expert testi.mony of Dr. Webb. Cd) There was no issue raised regarding
the professional skill or learning of the respondent. (e) The
question involved was whether respondent or his employees or
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assistants were negligent in failing to effect and maintain
proper sterilization for such examination. This negligence
was established as a question of fact by proof of (a), (b), and
(c), onder the principles of Barham v. Widi7lg, 210 Cal. 206
{291 P. 173], and also by the inference of such negligence
arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as announced
in Yba,.,.a v. 8pangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 {1M P.2d 687, 162
A.L.R. 1258].'
"The evidence which has been related puts the case squarely
within the doctrine of Barham v. Widing. 210 Cal. 206 [291 P.
173]. In that ease the defendant, a licensed dentist, extracted,
the left lower molar tooth of the plaintift'. In order to operate
a local anesthetic was administered by means of a hypodermic
injection of novocaine. The needle was twice inserted in the
gum of plaintiff at a point over the ramus or ascending prong
of the left lower jawbone near' the diseased tooth. After five
or six days an infection of the gum and jaw developed. A
physician testified that the locality of the primary infection
was the point where the hypodermic needle had been inserted
in the gum, that it 'was the center of the abscess; it was deep,
very deep, so that it must have been necessary that the infection was introduced . . . on a needle, or perhaps an unsterile
solution, because the pus was found very, very deep,' imd that
from his examination of the socket from which the tooth had
been removed the socket was not the seat of the infection. The
plaintift' had judgment. On appeal the defendanteontended
that •the judgment is not supported' by the evidence since
there is a total absence of medical expert testimony to the
eRect that the operation and treatment of the patient in the
emacting of the tooth did not eonform to the standard &Co
~pted method of the profession in that vicinity ,
"In affirming the judgment the court stated, page 213:
'The appellant asserts that the evidence is uot sufficient to
establish negligence on his part because there is no direct
testimony that the needle or solution which was used in administering the anesthetic was unsterile; that a dentist, like a
physician, is required to have and use only the degree of
learning and skin which is ordinarily possessed by the dentists of good professional reputation in that locality. This is
the rule with respect to physicians. (Buler v. California
Bospital Co., 178 Cal. 764 [174 P. 654].) Undoubtedly the
same rule applies to dentists. The jury was cltarly instructed
to this effect. It is equally true that cases which depend upon
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knowledge of the scientific effect of medicme, or the-result of
surgery, must ordinarily be established by expert testimony of
physicians and surgeons. (Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437
[181 P. 642].) This rule, however, applies only to such facts
as are peculiarly within the knowledge of such _professional
experts and not to facts which may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of a nonexpert ... [p.214.] The judgment in this case must be supported, if at all, upon the theory
of appellant's negligence in failing to sterilize his hypodermic
needle and the mouth and gum of the patient before performing the operation of extracting the tooth. It is true that both
the dentist and his nurse testified that the usual process of
sterilization was followed. It is equally true that there is no
direct evidence that he failed to sterilize either the needle or
the surface of the flesh where it was inserted. Barham does
state that he did not remember that the dentist sterilized his
mouth or gum.
" 'Under the circumstances of this case there is a remote
possibility that the infection developed from some cause other
than the defendant's failure to sterilize the needle or the gum
into which it was inserted, but the evidence is sufficient upon
which to warrant the jury in finding that it was caused by his
negligence in failing to follow these reasonable precautions in
spite of his testimony to the contrary. The jurors were entitled
to accept the solution to which these circumstances led them, in
preference. even. to the positive statements of the defendant
and his nurse to the contrary. After the verdict of a jury
has been fairly rendered, all the circumstances of the case,
together with every reasonable inference which may be drawn
therefrom, will be marshalled in support of the judgment.
Because of the very subtleness of the origin and development
of disease, less certainty is required in proof thereof. As the
court says in the case of Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 671
[262 P. 311, 312] :
" • .. If . . . it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively and
beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence resultcd
in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in a case
of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an
exact science."
.
.. 'It is not necessary in the trial of civil cases that the circumstances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as
the proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty as
to exclude every other cOllclusion . • •

Dec. 1949]

MooD fl. BBlIl'
1M Cold US, III PM .-J

639

.. 'In this 'ease no question is raised regarding the professional skill of the dentist. It is conceded that he was reasonably learned and skilful in his profession. But it is asserted that he was negligent in failing to sterilize the hypodermic needle and the gum into which he inserted the instrument. There is no conflict regarding the fact that infection
of the jaw caused the injuries to Barham. It is conclusive
that this infection developed within a few days after the opera~
tion on the ramus of the jaw at just the point where the needle
was inserted, and nof in the socket from which the tooth had
been removed . . .
41 '[p. 216.}
It was not necessary for any dentist or physician to state that the conduct of the defendant was, negligent
or in confiict with the usual established practice of the profession in that vicinity to administer a local anesthetic for
the purpose of extracting a tooth without sterilizing the needle,
or the flesh into which it is inserted. 'The court will take judicial knowledge of the necessity to use ordinary Care 'to procure sterilization under such circumstances. This ease was
tried upon the theory that everyone concerned' 'recogriized
this duty. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence
will support the judgment in this regard. ' .(See, also, M Co
Bride v. Sayli'JI, 6 Cal.2d 134 [56 P.2d 941] ; lnderbit.en v.
Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.App. 462 (12 P.2d 744, 13 P.2d ~(j5] ;
Thomsen v. BurgesOfl., 26 Cal.App.2d 235 [79 P.2d 136];
AndersOfl. v. Stump, 42 Cal.App.2d761 [109 P.2d '1027];
Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Ca1.App.2d 499, 504 [134 P.2d 865] ;
Dean v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646 [149 P.2d 288); CZemefll v.
Smith, 170 Ore. 400 [134 P.2d 424]; DrtJkes v. TullocA, 220
Mass. 256 [108 N.E. 9161 ; Hafemann v. SBflmM', 195 Wis. 625
[219 N.W. 375]; S1OafllOfl. v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506 [170 P.
135,137).)
"In the Barham ease a physician testified as an expert not
that the conduct of the dentist was negligent or in confiict with
the degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by dentists
in that vicinity, but simply to establish that the infection in
the plaintiff's jaw was caused by an unsterile hypodermic
needle or by an nnsterile solution. In the ease at bar appellant's
expert.testified merely for the purpose of establishing that the
infection in appellant's urinary tract was caused by an unsterile instrument or that the parts of appellant's body into l
and through which the instruments were inserted had Dot
been completely sterilized. The purpose of the expert testi-I
mony was precisely the same in each cue.
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"'l'hpre is no difference between the facts of the Barham
cast' and the farts of the case at 'bar In the Barham case a
needle was inserted into the gum and a solution injected. Five
or si~ days later an infection appeared. The point of infection was the place where the needle was inserted. It was held
that, without expert testimony, the jury could infer negligence.
lIere, instruments were inserted into the male organ and the
urinary tract and a solution injected. Twenty-four hours
later an infection appeared. The point of infection was the
urinary tract. The jury, without expert testimony, could infer
negligence. The evidence in the present case makes for a.
stronger inference of negligence than that in the Barham case.
In that case there was nQ evidence that the gum was not infected at the time the needle was inserted and the solution in-,
jected. Here the evidence-with the exception of the opinions
of two defense experts which were contrary to the testimony
of Dr. Belt that appellant's gellito-urinary system was negative-is without conflict that the urinary tract was in a Jiealthy
and normal condition and free from infection at the time the
instruments were inserted and the solution injected. In the
Barham case the infection did uot appear until five or six days
after the operation. Here the infection appeared about 24
hours after the examination.
"With the evidence stated before the jury, the court at
the request of respondent gave the following- instructions:
(1) 'Negligence upon the part ~f a physician is neve,., to be
presumed, and in the absence of expert testimony to the con,trary, it is to be presumed that a physician possesses and has
exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in examining
a patient.' (2) 'In determining the question of whether the
defendant was guilty of negligence as alleged in the complaint
you tallnot and must not set up a standard of your own but
. must be governed in that regard solely by the testimony of
expert witnesses who have appeared and testified in this case.'
Under these instructions the jury was not permitted to determine for themselves that failure to properly sterilize the instruments inserted into the appellant's body or failur(' to
properly sterilize the parts of the body through which the
instruments were in!\erted, or both, was negligence. Failure
on the part of a physician in either of these respects is negli~ellce as a matter of common knowledge. There is no law,
as applied to the facts of this case, which requires that the
jury in determining these questions be governed solely by the
tsetimony of expert witnesses. The practical effect of theSfl
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instructions W88 to direct the jury to return a verdict for the
respondent . . .
.
.. The court refused to give the following instructions requested by appellant: (1) 'In deterruiningwhether defendant's learning, skill and conduct fulfilled the duties imposed
on him by law. 88 they have been stated to you, you are not
permitted to set up arbitrarily a standard of your own. The
standard, I remind you, was set up by the learning, skill and
care ordinarily possessed and practiced by others of tbe same
profession iJi good standing, in the lame locality at the same
time. It follows, therefore, that except 88 hereinafter uplained the only ~ay you may properly learn that standard,
is through evidence presented in this trial by physicians and
surgeons called 88 expert witnesses.
.. 'However, there is this exception to the rule just stated:
when it is a matter of common knowledge that danger is
involved iJi certain conditions or iJi a failure to maintain certain conditions or to take certain precautionary measures, 88,
for instance, failure to perform the commonly known duties
of cleanliness or sterilization, expert testimony is not required
to establish sucb a fact, but it may be judicially noticed 88 a
part of that fund of common knowledge shared by us with our
fellow citizens generally.
" 'This exception may be otherwise stated 88 follows: When
it is common knowledge that an event or a CircuDlStl111ce that
has happened to or developed iJi a patient is of tbe kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the
part of the physician attendiJig him, the question whether or
not the condition W88 caused by negligence may be decided
from the general circumstances 88 shown by the evidence and
iJi the light of common experience and reason. t • • • •
"(2) 'If you believe from the preponderance of the evidence
that defendant, Elmer Belt, or any of his agents or employees,
negligently used or employed either unsterilized instruments
or solutions in the examination of the plaintiff or in the injecting into him of such solutions and that 88 the proximate
result thereof iJifection W88 introduced into plaintiff thereby
injuring him, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant,
Elmer Belt, his damages herein in 8uch sum as in your judgment, considering aU of tbe evidence, will jURtly compensate
him for any damage you believe him to hav(' sustained as the
proximate result thereof.' In Picru v. Putl'rson, 50 Cal.App.
2d 486, 489 [123 P.2d 544], the court quoted witb approval
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from Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.App.2d 28 [45 P.2d·350], as follows:
, .. It is well settled that a physician and surgeon cannot be
held to guarantee the results of his professional services.
'However, it is equally well settled that in undertaking a
treatment of a patient the practitioner impliedly contracts
and represents not only that he possesses the reasonable degree
of skill and learning possessed by others of his profession in
the locality, but that he will use reasonable and ordinary care
andskiZl in the application of s1wh knowledge to accompZish.
the purpose for which he is employed; and that if injury is
cBused by want of sllch skill or care on his part he is liable
fOl' the consequences which follow. (Houghtonv. Dickson,
29 Cal.App. 321 [155 P. 1281 ; Nelson v. Painless Parker. 104
Cal.App. 770 [286 P. 1078 j ; Perkins v. 7'rueblood, 180 Cal.
437 lI8I P. 642J ; Hesler v. Californta Hospital Co .• 178 Cal.
764 [174 P. 654] ; Ley Y. Billhopp, 88 Cal.App. 313 [263 P.
369j; Patterson Y. Marcus, 20;3 Cal. 550 [265 P. 222j.)" ,
(Italics added.) Appellant doe::; 110t contend that respondent
did not have the rel[uisite knowledge and skill. His contention
is that respondent was negligent in no proper sterilization.
Where the evidence conflicts, each party is entitled to have the
law given to the jury which is applicable to his theory of
the case and the testimony of his witnesses. (KelZey v. City
etc. of San Jt'rancisco, 58 Cal.App.2d 872, 876 [137 P .2d 719];
BllcHey v. Shell Chemical Co., Ltd., 32 Cal.App.2d 209, 216
lim P.2d 4:>3J ; Dowdall v. Gilmore Oil Co., Ltd., 18 Cal.App.
2d 1,5 l62 P.2d 1051J ; Renton, Hulmes d; Co. v. Monnier, 77
Cal. H!J,455 [19 P. 820].) This injunction is not met when
the instructions remove that theory from consideration of the
jury. (Morrow v. MendZeson, 15 Ca1.App.2d 15, 21 [58 P.2d
1302].) It is the duty of the court to give instructions expounding the law on every reasonable theory of the case finding support in the evidence. (Megee v. FasuZis, 65 Cal.App.
2d 94,101 [150 P.2d 2811.)
.. The evidence, without the testimony of experts, was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the infection was
caused by the negligence of respondent. It was, therefore,
prejudicial error to give the two instructions requested by
respondent and to refuse to give the two instructions requested
by appellant."
The instructions that were given as above quoted unequivocally removed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from the case.
No other interpretation thereof is possible. The instruction
which was given on that subject and upon which the majority
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rely as curing the questioned instruetion, is not aceurate and
could not have rt!1P.9ved the positive impression given to the
jury by the erroneous instruetion. As phrased in the majority opinion, it read: ". . . that if it be found that tht' plaintiff sustained injury as the result of the introduction by the
defendant of a ne~ infection, an inference arose that the
proximate cause of the injury was some negligence or malpractice on the part of the defendant which it was ineumbent
upon him to rebut by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence that the injury occumd without any failure of duty on
his part." The instruction given, in faet, reads: "If, and
only in the event, you should find that plainti1f,R. T. MOOD,
sustained injury as the result of the introduction by defendant, ELMER BELT, or any of his agents or employees, ofa new
infection you are instrueted as follows: An inferenee arises
that the proximate cause of such injury was some negligence
or malpraetice on the part of the defendant, ELMER BELT,
or his agents or employees. That inference is a form of evidence, and if there is none other tending to overthrow it, or
if the inference preponderates over contrary evidenee, it warrants a verdict in favor of plainti1f. Therefore. you should
weigh any evidence tending to overcome that inference, bearing in mind that it is incumbent upon the defendant to rebut
the inference by showing that the injury in question oceurred
without being proximately caused by any failure of duty on
his part, or on the part of any of his agents or employees.
"You are instru<.-ted that where an inference is permitted
by law, that sueh inference is only a species of evidenee, and
where sueh inference is rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence, then luch inference is dispelled and disappears from the ease." Manifestly, the instruction was in
square conflict with the instruction on e..~ert testimony and
its effect would be erased from the minds of the jury. It would
indicate to the jury that expert evidence was required under
all circumstanees.
In erlticizing the instruction on res ipsa loquitur offered by
plaintiff (but refused) the majority states that it omitted the
requirement of proximate cause. While such issue is not
mentioned in the instruction, it M.d t&O pZace fhere, for it dealt
solely with the evidence required to establish negligence. It
was not a formula instruction. It reads: "In determining
whether defendant's learning. skill and conduct· fulfilled the
duties imposed on him by law, as they have been stated to
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you, you are not permitted to set up arhitl'arily II Rtandard
of your own. The standard, I remind you. waR S(>t lip by the
learning, skill Clnd care ordinarily possf'sseJ a IIII Pl'lj('ti~E'd by
othf'rs of the same profession in good .itunding in t he same
locality at the same time. It follows. tht'refore. that except as
hereinafter explained the only way you may properly learn
that standard, is through evidence presented in this trial by
physicians and sllrgeons calh;d as expert witnesses.
"However. there is this exception to the rule just st.at('d:
when it is a matter of common knowledge that dallger is
involved in certain conditions or to take certain precautionary
mf'8SlIreS, as, for instance, failure to perform the commonly
known duties of cleanliness or sterilization, expert testimony is
not required to establish such a fact, but it may bf' judicially
notieed as a part of that fund of common knowledge shared by
us with our fellow citizens generally.
"This exception may bf' otherwise stated as follows: When
it is common knowledge that an event or a circumstance that
has happened to or developed in a patient is of the kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the
part of the physician attending him, the question whethf'r
or not the condition was caused by negligence may be decided
from the general circumstances as shown by the evidence and
in the light of common experience and reason." The subject
of proximate cause was properly and adequately covered in
other instructions.
The majority opinion. in an endeavor to escape the holdings
ill Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173]. and other
I'/lses cited in connection therewith, has this to say: "In the
(,IISf'S cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence
flint the defendant did not cause the injury wa.~ remote Rnll
it followed as a matter of common knowledge from thE.' natllre of the injury that the result would not happen withont
carl'lessness or negligence. In the present CRse the inferf'lwe
thRt the injury was not caused by the defendant. but from
some source theretofore exi!>tinll in the plaintiff's systt'm. I('n.~
1101 remote bllt could be rlrawn from substantial t'virlence in
thf' rl'cord. Thf'refore tht' plaintiff has not necessarily hl'O!l!!'ht
the injury home to the defp.ndant. Bl'fore the ('ompf'lJill!?
inference based on common knowledge, which is at thE.' root of
thf' res ipsa loquitur doctrine. would be justified it became
necessary for the plaintiff to eliminate himself as a proximate
CRUSf' of the injury." Thp pvic1pn<'e was not "remot.E.''' that
the defendant did not cause thl' injury in the cited cases. In
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the Barham case Ihe defendant and hil "urlB IUlifled po,itively that Ihe ",edl' was sterilized. The same is true of
BeZlandi v. Park Sanitarium ABSn., 214 Cal. 472 [6 P.2d 508] ;
Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156 [159 P. 436] ; Dean
v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646 [149 P.2d 288J; and Mastro v.
Kennedy, 57 Cal.App.2d 499 [134 P.2d 865]. If it is meant
by the quoted statement that all the evidence must "necessarily" show that defendant caused the injury, and that similarly it must all show that some independt>nt phYlucal condition of plaintiff was not the cause, then we have some strange
law on res ipsa loquitur. The fallacy of the reasoning is
pointed out in Mastro v. Kennedy, .upra. There plaintiff suffered an infection in the jaw after the dentist had removed
a tooth, and in the process administered Il painkiller by
hypodermic needle. The court there said: "We may also
accept as established facts, that immediately after the extraction there was no infection on the roots of the tooth nor
in the sockets; that a serious infection set in which caused
plaintiff much su1fering and expense over a period of two
years.
"The case of Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291P. 173],
has features quite similar to those of the instant case. There,
a dentist was accused of malpractice because be failed to
sterilize the hypodermic needle used in injecting an anesthetic,
and to sterilize the gums before extracting a tooth . . • I quoting from Barham v. Widing, -FaJ : 'As the court says in
the case of Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 671 [262 P. 311,
312]:
" , "If ... it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively
and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence resulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in
a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is
not an exact science."
4' 'It is not necessary in the trial of civil cases that the cireum.stances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as
the proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty
as to exclude every other conclusion. It is sufficient if there
is substantial evidence upon which to reasonably support the
judjlment • • .'
,. Defendants seek to distinguish the instant case from the
Barham case, because there, the infection started from the
exact spot of the injection, while in this case it was in the
.. C.Jcl-II
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general locality but not ncceslinrily ill till' l'xact spot of the
injel'tiolls. This distinction is too tpilllOtlS io be sUIIIHl. Here,
the infection was in the region wlil're the lIt'l'dle piercetl the
ullsterilized gums, and the reasollable illft'rence might [ollow,
if drawn by the jury, that a germ on the unsterile gums was
carried into the tissue all the needle and caused the infection.
'l'l!e result of all ullsterile cOllditiou is a matter of common
knowledge under the cases already cited.
". . . 'rhe danger of infection from an unsterile instrument, or a dirty field of operation, is a matter of such common
. knowledge that a jury is authorized to draw the reasonable
inference that an infection was caused by negligence where
all unsterile instrument is used, or the operative field is
not properly sterilized . . . [cases cited].
"In Roberts v. Parker, 121 Cal.App. 264 [8 P.2d 9081,
a dentist was sued for malpractice where osteomyelitis of the
jawbone set in after an operation where no X-ray had been
taken to determine the condition of the field of operation.
Experts testified that under the standards of good practice
prevailing in the community an X-ray should have been taken
before the tooth was extracted.. There was evidence introduced on behalf of the defendant tending to prove that the
disease had its source other than in the extraction of a tooth.
It was argued that there was nothing to show that the failure
to use due care on the part of the dentist was the proximate
cause of the osteomyelitis. In disposing of this argument
t he court said:
" 'Therefore, if in spite of the testimony tending to show
a different origin of the disease there be testimony to sustain
the opposite conclusion which has been reached by the jury,
its verdict must be sustained. In other words after the verdict
of the jury has been fairly rendered, all the circumstances
of the case, together with any reasonable inference which
may be drawn therefrom, will be marshaled in support of
the judgment. (Barham v. Widing, supra.) Measured by
the foregoing rules the circumstances of the present casc are
legally sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. (Dimock v.
Miller, sltpra; Barham v. Widing, supra; Ley v. BisJlOpp,
supra.)' "
There is clearly no basis for a distinction between the
case at bar and Barham v. lfiding, supra, so far as the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, and
the attemptcu distinc~tion in thr majority opinion will not
stand t.he test of intelligent Ilnuiasecl serutiny. If this doc-
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trine is applicable to this case, then there can be no question
but that the jury was erroneously instructed. and that sucb
error was prejudicial to plaintiff.
I would, therefore, nverse the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J. t Dissenting.-I cannot agree that it was not
prejudicially erroneous for the trial court to limit the testimony of plaintiff's only expert witness. In a field of law in
which expert testimony is essential, the rulings below deprived
plaintiff of a fair opportunity to prove the allegations of his
complaint.
It was necessary for plaintiff to establish by competent evidence that (1) the infection was centered in the genito-urinary
tract, (2) there was no infection, latent or chronic, when defendant made the examination, and that (3). the infection was·
caused by defendant's failure to exercise due care in the
conduct of the examination, particularly in the sterilization
of the instruments used.
Plaintiff does not dispute that there was no direct evidence
tending to establish that defendant was negligent. It WIUI
not essential that he produce such evidence. Upon proof
that the infection originated in the area examined and that
it was not present before the examination, the jury ('ould
reasonably infer that the infection was introduced by the
examination and therefore caused by the negligence of the
defendant. It is common knowledge that infections do not
ordinarily occur during medical treatment unless there is
negligence. (Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 216 [291 P.
1731.) If the plaintiff establishes by expert testimony that
his infection arose during medieaI treatment and that it would
not ordinarily arise in the absence of negligent treatment,
the jury may infer negligence on the basis of res ipsa loquitur.
(Sins v. Owens, 33 Oal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 31; Bcllandi
v. Park Sanitarium Asm., 214 Cal. 472, 480 [6 P.2d 5081;
Barham v. Widing, supra.)
Plaintiff could rely upon res ipsa loquitur, however, only
if he established by expert testimony the first two elements
of his case, the location of the infection and the nature of
its origin, which are not matters of common knowledge. (Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Oal. 437 (181 P. 6421 ; Sim v. Weeks, 7
Oal.App.2d 28 [45 P.2d 350]; Slimak v. I<'Qster, 106 Oonn.
366 [138 A. 153] j ahride v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825; see eases
collected in 141 A.L.R. 5-50.)
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Plaintiff introduced the testimony of Dr. Frank Webb.
After plaintiff's counsel had iriterrogated Dr. Webb about
his educational back~roulld and professional experience defense counsel raised doubts as to the witness's qualifications.
The trial court permitted Dr. Webb to answer only one hypothetical question based on evidence before the court. He was
not permitted to testify about his experience with diseases and
infe('tions of the genito-urinary tract, although the offer of
pl'oof in chambers indicated that he had considerable knowledge thereof. Plaintiff's counsel made it clear that "we are
not asking the witness to testify as to the procedure that was
uS<:'d. Weare asking him to testify as to the cause and
nat ure of this infection." The trial court nonetheless refused to permit any furtht>r questioning about the location
and nature of the infection upon defense counsel's objection
that the witness was not an expert in the performance of
cystoscopic examinations and Ilaci not seen one performed
in Los Angeles in 1944. This ruling precluded the witness
from testifying that the infection was not caused by a septic
condition in the tl'act at the time of the examination and
that the condition was not a local or systemic one originating
bt'fore the examination. Plaintiff's case depended upon his
ability to disprove thosepossibiIities.
During the course of his examination, the witness stated
that he assumed the examination had been competently condul'feci. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the
witlless:
"Q Doctor, from the hypothetil'al question that was propounded to you you assumed that the cystoscopic examination
was made very competently and very thoroughly, did you not f
.• A. ManipUlation of the instruments or manual-what
I mean to say is that the instruments or the manual manipulation of them was evidently very good .
.. MR. STERRY'l defense counsel): I move that the answer
be stricken as not responsive to the question.
"\VilJ you read the que!it inn 1
.. ('1'he reporter reads the last question.)
"A. I assumed that-"Q. Will you just answer that yes or no, doctor'
"A. I can answer that yes.
.
"MR. STERRY: That is all."
On redirect examination, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Webb
hew he would explain his answer. Upon objection, the court
refUsed to permit an answer to the question on the ground
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11Iat there was no ambiguity in defense counsel'. question
. Dr in the witneas's answer. The record does not 81JStain
~at holding. From the offer of proof in chambers, it appears that Dr. Webb meant to testify only that the actual
physical conduct of the examination was competent. Be did
Dot intend by that statement to express an opinion about
the sterilization technique before the examination. Since he
was not permitted to make that explanation, the jury was
left with the impression that plainti1f's only expert witness
approved defendant's conduct of the examination in all ita
phases. The prejudicial effect of' the trial court's ruling is
readily apparent. It has beeD repeatedly held that the refuaaJ
of a trial court to permit the witness to explain a yes or no
answer is reversible error. (McGuire v. BtJird, 9 Cal.2d 353,
355.356 [70 P.2d 915]; Webber v. Pork Auto TromporioRota
00.,138 Wash. 325 [244 P. 718] ; 58 Am.Jur. 321.)
The trial court refused to permit the plainti1f'. witness
to answer more than a single hypothetical question and expressed doubt as to his competence to testify at all. The approval of that ruling by the majority opinion throws an
overwhelming burden of proof on the plainti1f in malpractice
eases. The majority opinion states that the exclusion of Dr.
Webb's testimony was not erroneous for the reason that "A
medical expert is not qualified as a witness unless he is shown
not only to have the required professional knowledge, learning and skill to express his opinion, but is also familiar with
the standards required of physicians under similar circumstances. " This statement and the eases cited in ita support
are inapplicable to the present case. It may be conceded that
a medical expert called to testify that a defendant did not
exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised
by members of the profession under similar circumstances
must be familiar with the standard of care prevalent among
the members of the profession. A medical practitioner who
testifies as to the standard of care ordinarily exercised by a
.pecialist in a given ease must either be a specialist himself
or must show familiarity with the methods of such specialists.
(McGuire v. Boird, 9 Cal.2d 353, 356 [70 P.2d 915]; 8iu v.
Owens,33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 8].) Dr. Webb, however,
did not ., testify to the degree of care against which the treatment given is to be measured." (8inz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d
749, 753 [205 P.2d 3].) He was called to testify solely as to
the location and nature of the infection, matters within the

I

j

/

550

MOORE

v.

BELT

[34 C.2d

province of any competent medical practitioner. His degree
of familiarity with cystoscopy technique and the conduct of
cystoscopic examinations is irrelevant, for he was not called
to testify about the technique or the standard of conduct of
the examination. "The law does not require the best possible
kiJid of a witness, but only persons of such qualifications as
the community daily and reasonably relies upon in seeking
medical advice . . . the ordinary medical practitioner should
be received on all matters as to which a regular medical
training necessarily involves some general knowledge."
(2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 569, p. 665.) When the subject of
inquiry is not the required standard of care but the nature
of an ailment or its location, "a physician of practice and
experience is an expert and . . . it is not necessary that a
witness of this class should have made the particular disease
involved in any inquiry a specialty in order to make his testimony admissible as an expert." (Drucker v. Philadelphia
Dairy Products Co., Inc., 35 Del. 437, 441 [166 A. 796];
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y. 389, 398
[34 N.E.2d 367] ; Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 430 [94
N.W. 607] ; Young v. Stevens, 132 N.J.L. 124, 126 [39 A.2d
115) ; Hathaway's Administrator v. National Life Insurance
Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351; Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 515, 516
[170 P. 135].)
The testimony that plaintiff's witness was allowed to present
demonstrates that he is a competent practicing physician
familiar with general medical practice, that he has kept abreast
of the latest developments by research and study, and that
he has had experience with diseases and infections of the
genito-urinary tract. Treatment of infections and knowledge
of their nature, cause, and effect, are the stock in trade of
the practicing physician. The growth of specialization does
not disqualify a general practitioner from signalizing the
existence of an infection in a patient's body merely becausl'
he is not a specialist on that part of the body where the in·
fection exists. The trial court, therefore, committed error
in holding that Dr. Webb was not qualified to testify as to
the location of plaintiff's infection and to its probable time
of origin.
The majority opinion holds that even if it were error to
exclude Dr. Webb's testimony, it would not be prejuuicial
since Dr. Webb testified in reply to the one question he was
permitted to answer over defeIHlallt's objection that he believed the infection was carried into tIll: urinary tract by the

